Second Treatise -the fact remains (it will be urged) that he nevertheless did say the things Macpherson said he did.
But there is a third mode of critique, which we might call refuting an argument on its own terms. On this method, one shows that the passages adduced as evidence by the interpretergiven no more than their immediate context -did not mean what they were presented as meaning. I take it that systematically refuting an argument on its own terms is the most powerful critique that can be made of an interpretation. It shows that the exegesis was not even partially right -it was not even showing us one strand in the intellectual tapestry of a complex thinker. If an argument can be fully refuted on its own terms then the problem is not that the interpreter was cherry-picking the canon; it is that their pickings were not cherries at all.
In this essay I take up this mantle. I will contest Macpherson's thesis using only the passages he himself brings to bear as evidence as well as any immediate context (within two or three paragraphs) relevant to those passages. I will only refer to an overall text on a point where Macpherson himself refers to the entire text: for instance in his assertions of the overall 'emphasis of' or 'concepts in' a work. And operating wholly within that restricted purview, I will show the textual evidence offered by Macpherson in support of his keystone theses is misleading, misconstrued, misplaced or otherwise mistaken. And I will take this mode of critique into the very core of Macpherson's reading of Locke, where to this day his sharpest critics accept Macpherson's renderings -into those crucial passages of Locke's Chapter Five 'On Property'.
I Macpherson's four key theses: primary evidence
Macpherson does not deny Locke held some genuinely egalitarian natural law commitments regarding equal rights and rationality. These postulates are acknowledged by Macpherson on to reject all these readings, I will for expository ease in the following account describe
Locke's passages wholly as Macpherson understood and deployed them. To avoid repetition, my treatment here of Macpherson's theses and his evidence is schematic -more detail will emerge when we proceed to the remaining sections.
Macpherson's first major thesis is that possessive individualists are 'infinite appropriators' in the sense that there are no significant limitations on their capacities to acquire land and capital at the expense of others (PI:206-20). In particular, Locke's 'sufficiency proviso' -the restriction that appropriators of land must leave 'enough and as good' for others -is overcome or transcended. Crucially, Locke asserts at ST §36 that the sufficiency proviso is removed with the introduction of money. Locke then attempts to justify this removal in several ways. First, Locke's view that people tacitly consent to money (ST §36, §47- §50) implies their consent to the inevitable consequences of a commercial economy. Those consequences, as Locke was well aware, include the development of wagelabor at necessarily subsistence levels (C:18, 20, 38). Second, Locke argues that by increasing the net total of wealth, appropriators actually benefit non-owners (ST §37). Third, Locke never thought 'enough and as good' was strictly required; he never uses this phrase when discussing periods after the advent of money, and this proviso was in any case only 13 Propriety and the robust proviso, ST §36 is announcing that for the first time it is a genuine constraint on appropriation.
Locke justifies the removal of the robust proviso by consent to money
The significance to Macpherson's overall interpretation of his mis-reading of ST §36 is difficult to exaggerate. Macpherson himself admits that in the early editions of the Treatise The problems with this use of the Considerations, however, are substantial. At this point our exegetical alternatives are these: we can impute an un-expressed line of thought to Locke that is on the one hand poorly reasoned on its own terms and on the other aligns disastrously with the rest of his argument in Ch. V, in order to sustain an interpretation of a single sentence that (as we saw in the foregoing section) is at best questionable and at worst expresses exactly the opposite of what Locke himself was saying. Or we can accept that the consent to money involves no more than what Locke says it does, and that the robust proviso is untouched.
Locke's productivity argument of ST §37
Macpherson suggests Locke himself might have been aware of the limitations of his 
Locke's replacement of the robust proviso with the subsistence proviso
But perhaps Locke never really advanced the robust proviso in the first place (PI:213-14).
Rather than intending that appropriators should be restrained by the robust proviso,
Macpherson argues that all Locke required was the subsistence proviso: that appropriators ensure others can work for their survival. (One might wonder how Macpherson can at once hold that Locke explicitly removed the robust proviso and that he never held it.) Macpherson offers two arguments to this end: first, the robust proviso was derivative of the more fundamental subsistence proviso. Second, Locke does not refer to the robust proviso after the advent of money, suggesting it was no longer applicable after that point. 31 Waldron, 'Enough and as Good', 323. Macpherson manage to convince himself that the proviso is not derived from those initial natural rights? 34 We are faced with a case where a commentator accepts that a theorist holds unambiguously asserted postulate , accepts that from  it is possible to validly derive , accepts that the theorist repeatedly asserted , but then asserts that the theorist did not really mean to assert , because the ground for  was actually not  but some other premise entirely, a premise that in fact does not manage to ground , but only a much weaker claim. And then, more striking again, not only does the commentator deny the theorist ever held , but in order to explain his or her putative failure to hold  the commentator moves backwards to impute new unspoken postulates to the theorist that are directly contradictory with the originally admitted postulate . This really will not do.
Macpherson's final claim -that Locke never uses the robust proviso in his discussion of 
III

Macpherson's Third Key Thesis
The final argument to be assessed is Macpherson's position that Locke believed -as an unargued assumption shared by his readers -that members of the laboring class were not rational in the sense of being able to be guided in matters of morality by their rationality.
They were not so because the exacting conditions under which they labored left no space for higher thoughts.
Macpherson's characterization of The Reasonableness of Christianity on this point has been substantially critiqued; 37 here I will focus on his equally troubling re-imagining of the 
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It would be hard to say which part of these remarks is the most revealing. There is the assumption that the laborers are normally kept too low to be able to think or act politically. There is the assumption that on the rare occasions when they do raise their thoughts above bare subsistence, the only kind of political action they will take is armed insurrection. There is the assumption that maladministration consists not of leaving the poor at bare subsistence, but of allowing such unusual distress to occur as will unite them in armed revolt. And there is the conviction that such revolt is improper, an offence against the respect they owe to their England' (C:46). He suggests all three relevant groups (monied/merchants, landowners, and laborers) would be jealous and suspicious of others, and that they will wish to employ their powers to retrieve their losses. Locke continues: 'But this is but scrambling amongst our selves, and helps no more against our want, than the pulling of a short coverlet will, amongst children, that lie together, preserve them all from the cold. Some will starve, unless the father of the family provide better, and enlarge the scanty covering' (C:46). Locke thinks this pointless and ill-conceived struggle is normally between the landowners and the merchants.
Macpherson's quoted passage is the explanation of why the laborer is not liable to take part in the struggle.
Thus: I) Locke is only talking about a type of useless struggle where classes use their de facto powers to try and illicitly take from others who they mistakenly think are responsible 39 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, 268.
for their losses. For the laboring class, such illicit action must come in the form of armed insurrection. The landowners will instead try to make laws to recoup their losses from the merchants. Clearly, seventeenth century laborers could not subvert justice that way. Locke is no more saying that the only impact on policy possible by laborers in general is armed insurrection than he is saying the only impact on policy possible by the landowners in general is illicit grasping from merchants. 
Conclusion
In an early review of Macpherson's book, Isaiah Berlin complained that it was a tedious business defending traditional interpretations against new ones. Ultimately, all the evidence Macpherson provides for his radical capitalist reading of Locke can be dismantled purely on its own terms. The thesis warrants burial.
